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A Greek bailout deal has been agreed in principle between the country’s government and its
creditors. Defne Gonenc writes that throughout the crisis there has been a tendency to view
economics as detached from politics, with the impact of economic policies on individual citizens
largely pushed to the sidelines in discussions surrounding the technicalities of a bailout deal. She
argues that rather than pursuing economics for its own sake, a better approach would be to adopt a
narrative that focuses on what economic solutions can do for society.
We are living in a world where economics is understood to be detached from political and
humanitarian aﬀairs. Many praise the separation of the social sciences, with admiration being given to economics’
increasingly technical language and constructed rules. It is easy to forget, however, that economics exists for us, the
people, and that every economic decision is an inherently political one. Unfortunately, this nuance is frequently
overlooked in introductory economics classes.
Discourses on technicalities and the complicated mathematical rules of economics have been trumpeted by
technocratic actors to such an extent that economics at times appears to exist more for its own sake than for society.
When the humanitarian aspect of economics is missed, this principle can much too easily become a tool for simply
sustaining the status quo. In fact, understanding economics is not diﬃcult: it simply requires opening our eyes and
our minds to its consequences.
The Greek debt crisis, in particular the referendum held on 5 July, has oﬀered one such route to understanding the
human side of economics. The referendum took place against the backdrop of an international discourse
championing the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘European rules’, among others. Although Syriza has failed to make
meaningful use of this so far, the referendum uncovered several fundamental dichotomies that underpin the daily
lives of Europeans, whether they choose to acknowledge them or not: the tensions between a ‘technocratic elite’
and the rest of society; the trade-oﬀ between the demands of a shared currency and monetary independence; and
the relationship between the recessionary surplus region east of the Rhine/north of the Alps and states in the rest of
Europe.
Yet the debt crisis has also been analysed using other dichotomies instead. One such dichotomy is that between
‘supranationalism’ and ‘nationalism’. While the campaigns in the referendum supported a ‘solution within Europe’,
adopting the discourse that ‘Greece belongs to Europe’, the debate was not principally about nationalism or
supranationalism. Instead it was a debate focused on the impact of austerity on citizens. The implication is that the
Greek people may well ﬁnd a solution within the EU framework if technocratic leaders move away from their
promotion of austerity policies.
Another frequently cited dichotomy is that between the EU project and its voters. Again, this largely misses the key
dynamics at play: namely opposition to the policies supported by EU institutions and the IMF. The EU project itself is
not reducible to these policies and oﬀers far more than a particular economic viewpoint promoted by a speciﬁc
group of actors from the EU and the international community.
Next is the dichotomy between ‘stability’ and ‘chaos’. The Greek people did not, contrary to frequent claims, vote for
chaos. Stability would not be possible through ‘correct administrative regulation’, and refusing an austerity package
should not be condemned as a chaotic ideological choice. In fact, the packages oﬀered by the country’s creditors
were clearly ideologically based in their own right, despite the language of ‘stability’ and ‘regulations’.
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Finally, there is the popular narrative concerning
Greek over-spending within the common currency.
The reality is that Greece is not suﬀering from a crisis
of over-spending. The image of ‘lazy’ Greeks
enjoying a lifestyle ﬁnanced by the hard work of other
European citizens is inaccurate: rather, the real
reason for the crisis is the indeﬁnite continuation of
Greek debt following several years of unsuccessful
policies being imposed as apparent solutions.
Evaluating the Greek crisis from the perspective of
these dichotomies is a largely fruitless exercise.
Understanding the ﬂaws contained within these
narratives is of the utmost importance as it allows for
the crisis to be presented in the correct analytical
framework, thus revealing the true roots of the
problems being faced by Greece.
The real cause of the Greek crisis
The key reason behind the high indebtedness of the Greek economy is its low competitiveness levels compared to
its European counterparts. The decline in standing of the Greek economy can be traced back to the early 1990s.
Upon EEC accession, Greece was unable to undertake the required structural changes necessary to remain
competitive in the single market where the logic of comparative advantage dominates. This loss of competiveness,
when combined with the political misuse of public resources – which had started in the mid-1970s after the fall of the
junta with the aim of easing other political and societal demands – paved the way for a high trade deﬁcit, high public
deﬁcit and high public debt.
Moreover, the monetary policy shared with other European countries under the single currency was incompatible
with the Greek interests. Fixing the drachma to the euro at an overvalued rate, due to the preceding excessive
monetary adjustment, ensured that Greece’s ‘euro journey’ began on the wrong foot. At the same time, particularly
after the mid-1990s, the country’s gross national saving rate began to decline without a corresponding increase in
the investment rate. Consequently, Greece has become dependent on importing. Its production base contracted and
its trade deﬁcit along with its indebtedness grew.
Furthermore, due to the modernisation of debt management in the 2000s, 80 per cent of Greece’s public debt was
held abroad. As soon as the liquidity dried up, the GDP growth rate became negative and bond yields shot up,
Greece’s public debt became unsustainable. The lack of a ﬁscal union and the failure of the other Eurozone
countries to give a quick collective response to Greece’s ailing economy also contributed to the severity of the Greek
crisis today. The ﬁnancial demands made by Europe have all but crushed the Greek economy, led to mass
unemployment and a collapse of the country’s banking system, making the external debt crisis far worse.
Currently, Germany is proﬁting from Greece, as it prolongs loans at comparatively high interest rates. The outcome
of lending money is no longer having the debt reimbursed with a proﬁt, but the indeﬁnite continuation of the debt,
which ultimately keeps Greece in a position of permanent dependency and subordination. Almost none of the large
sums of money loaned to Greece has actually gone to its people. Instead, it has been used to pay oﬀ private-sector
creditors – including German and French banks – in this perpetual debt cycle. The current solutions oﬀered will only
ensure another “Greek crisis” in the future.
Devaluation as a solution?
Under such circumstances, one solution would be a devalued drachma. This could result in Greek goods becoming
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more competitive in foreign markets, and by boosting exports, it would help the Greek economy get back on track.
But, alone it would not provide a comprehensive ﬁx. Although devaluation may lead to a short-term boost in exports
driven by a cheaper local currency, it does not assure a productivity increase among Greek ﬁrms. An increase in
competitiveness – along with currency devaluation – is what stands behind long-term, sustainable growth. And to
this purpose, austerity measures have not worked out.
To be able to oﬀer a healthy framework for solutions, the view that the individual is a customer rather than a human
being needs to be altered. Likewise, the practice of imposing the same austerity programme in all situations
regardless of speciﬁc circumstances must be changed. This is a programme in which every country must place the
control of inﬂation ahead of other economic objectives; instantaneously remove barriers to trade and the ﬂow of
capital; liberalise banking systems; reduce government spending on everything; and privatise assets that can be
sold to foreign investors. Dismantling public spending is actually destroying health and education at the expense of
ordinary people – and the economy is, after all, for us, the people.
The Greek referendum has often been criticised as an act of populism. But the sole existence of the referendum
opened up the possibility for openly criticising the policies that, until then, had been championed as an undisputed
path toward prosperity. Alas, the Greek leadership has yet to prove as courageous as its own people.
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